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1 Introduction 
 
University autonomy is under challenge for several reasons nowadays. Recent years have 
witnessed many factors influencing the level of higher education institutions’ (HEI) 
autonomy1 and governance system including demographic trends, the effect of financial and 
economic crisis or new missions that universities and research institutions are expected to 
fulfil. Although the need to increase university autonomy is generally recognised, there is a 
growing tendency for governments to interfere with university autonomy and academic 
freedom in certain European states in the last decade. 
The article seeks to explore these changing trends from a comparative, cross-country 
perspective focusing on certain striking examples. We argue that, beyond formal indicators 
(independent decision of universities, free admission etc.), the level of de facto university 
autonomy is intensively affected by other 'secondary' or even indirect factors. These may be 
general policy priorities of the central government, competition between universities, not HE-
related sector-political measures or other administrative, political, and societal factors. 
Though the study primarily focuses on public universities, the position of private higher 
education institutions will also be examined where necessary. The analysis extends to those 
relations and interactions between different levels in the EU multi-level governance system 
which are relevant to explain and understand the tendencies in the four dimensions of 
university autonomy. In this context, we are also asking whether the relevant European 
institutions have appropriate instruments to enforce Member State's compliance with the 
requirements of academic freedom and university autonomy. 
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2 Why university autonomy? 
 
“Higher education without academic freedom – the ability of staff to pursue research and 
teach without fear of being censored or disciplined – is not higher education at all.” –an expert 
argues (Andrews, 2015). The principles of academic freedom and institutional autonomy were 
first declared (in written form) by the Magna Charta Universitatum of 1988 as a guideline for 
good governance and self-understanding of universities in the future. Based on the century-
long traditions on the interpretation of European universities’ identity, it has been confirmed 
that „The university is an autonomous institution at the heart of societies differently organised 
because of geography and historical heritage; it produces, examines, appraises and hands 
down culture by research and teaching. To meet the needs of the world around it, its research 
and teaching must be morally and intellectually independent of all political authority and 
economic power.” Though the importance of university autonomy is still beyond doubt, the 
narrative of its several dimensions is much more differentiated than at the time when it was 
declared by the Magna Charta. The role of higher education institutions have transformed into 
a more complex set of functions over the last few decades, current understanding of university 
autonomy have therefore also changed. The impact of recent economic, political and societal 
factors – such as the development of international trade and political relations, impact of the 
global financial crises, social tensions etc. – is remarkable in this regard. All these factors 
made expectations towards modern higher education institutions more heterogeneous today 
than thirty years earlier. Therefore, a proper understanding of university autonomy can only 
be obtained through a holistic view of the complex inter-relationships between stakeholders 
and policies. As emphasised by the vice-chair of the Association of University 
Administrators, “Self-governance is a must for the sector, but we must use it to engage with 
wider society’s concerns [...]” (Andrews, 2015). 
 
 
3 Dimensions and Indicators of University Autonomy 
 
In the following section, an attempt will be made to explore the state of play of university 
autonomy in Europe, as well as recent trends of changes and developments in this regard. Our 
analysis mainly based on data published in the third Autonomy Scorecard of the European 
University Association (EUA) of April 2017 comparing the higher education system of 29 
European countries (Pruvot–Estermann, 2017; in the following 'Scorecard' or 'EUA report').2 
The Scorecard is based on 30 different core indicators in four key dimensions of autonomy, i. 
e. organisational autonomy (Pruvot–Estermann, 2017: 14–20, 41–43, 53–59); financial 
autonomy (Pruvot–Estermann, 2017: 21–27, 44–46, 53–59); staffing autonomy (Pruvot–
Estermann, 2017: 28–32, 47–49, 53–59) and academic autonomy (Pruvot–Estermann, 
2017:33–39, 50–52, 53–59). 
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Table 1 
Autonomy indicators and their weighting factors 
 
INDICATOR 
WEIGHTING 
FACTOR 
Organisational 
autonomy 
Selection procedure for the executive head 14% 
Selection criteria for the executive head 14% 
Dismissal of the executive head 12% 
Term of office of the executive head 9% 
Inclusion of external members in university governing bodies 12% 
Selection of external members in university governing bodies 12% 
Capacity to decide on academic structures 15% 
Capacity to create legal entities 12% 
Financial 
autonomy 
Length of public funding 14% 
Type of public funding 13% 
Ability to keep surplus 14% 
Ability to borrow money 9% 
Ability to own buildings 12% 
Ability to charge tuition fees for national/EU students 17% 
Ability to charge tuition fees for non-EU students 21% 
Staffing 
autonomy 
Capacity to decide on recruitment procedures (senior academic staff) 13% 
Capacity to decide on recruitment procedures (senior administrative 
staff) 
13% 
Capacity to decide on salaries (senior academic staff) 12% 
Capacity to decide on salaries (senior administrative staff) 12% 
Capacity to decide on dismissals (senior academic staff) 12% 
Capacity to decide on dismissals (senior administrative staff) 12% 
Capacity to decide on promotions (senior academic staff) 13% 
Capacity to decide on promotions (senior administrative staff) 12% 
Academic 
autonomy 
Capacity to decide on overall student numbers 14% 
Capacity to select students 14% 
Capacity to introduce and terminate programmes 16% 
Capacity to choose the language of instruction 13% 
Capacity to select QA mechanisms 15% 
Capacity to select QA providers 11% 
Capacity to design content of degree programmes 16% 
Source: Pruvot–Estermann, 2017 
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3.1 Organisational Autonomy 
 
Organizational autonomy refers to the ability to decide on university structures and their 
status, procedures and criteria for selecting the bodies and decision-making factors, as well as 
the ability to decide on the involvement of outsiders in the work of the university and the 
ability to create distinct legal bodies (Cotelanic et al., 2015: 2). 
The Scorecard shows that governance reforms in the last decade changed the status of higher 
education institutions in several countries in a positive way, usually towards a greater freedom 
from the states (see in particular France, Italy, Sweden). In most cases, there is a parallel 
tendency of increased participation of external members in the university governing bodies 
(see HE reforms in France in 2013 or in Lithuania in 2016, for instance). Most universities are 
also free to determine their internal academic structures and can create legal entities.3 In many 
countries, institutions gain more autonomy if they carry out certain additional activities 
through such distinct legal entities.  
Though the progress in the field of organisational autonomy is noticeable, it is also pointed 
out in the Scorecard that there is no general positive trend in Europe towards allowing more 
autonomy to universities. There are also a series of setbacks, with different kinds of meaning 
for higher education in general. The example of Hungary is mentioned as "an isolated case" 
(Pruvot–Estermann, 2017: 54) which shows that there can be direct interventions of the state 
aimed at re-asserting more control over university activities. This is mainly because of the 
creation of the ’chancellor’ position in Hungarian universities (existing since July 2014) 
which fundamentally alters the capacity of institutions to organise themselves. The position 
includes responsibilities for financial and staffing matters, while the rector remains 
responsible for academic matters. (The rector, for instance, must seek the chancellor’s 
approval for any decision on staff salaries.) The chancellor is directly appointed by the Prime 
Minister (for a detailed analysis on the chancellor's position, see: Kováts, 2015: 31–37). 
 
3.2 Financial Autonomy 
 
Financial autonomy provides financing means, ability and mechanisms for attracting and 
allocating funds and the opportunity to borrow money (under normal market conditions). It 
also provides the right on buildings’ ownership, to decide on tuition fees and charges for the 
provision of other services (Cotelnic et al., 2015: 2). 
The characteristics of the funding system have an influence on many aspects of university 
autonomy. In most European countries, universities are largely funded by state resources, with 
the associated expectation that they fulfil a series of societal missions. There exists a great 
variety across Europe as to funding models for higher education.  
In almost all countries, universities receive their core public funding through block grants.4 
However, internal allocation possibilities across categories (such as salaries, research 
expenditures, operational costs) are very often limited by law. Line-item budgets5 are 
exceptionally (this funding system exist, in its original form, only in Serbia). Hungary is 
expressly mentioned in the EUA Report (Pruvot–Estermann, 2017: 54) as an extreme case 
where, in addition to the lack of internal shifting possibilities, any decision with financial 
implications must receive the approval of the chancellor (who is, as mentioned, directly 
appointed by the Prime Minister). This post definitely changed the capacity of the university 
to decide on internal funding allocation since 2014. While governing bodies may include 
representatives of public authorities in other systems, as well (as in Belgium or Luxembourg), 
with important responsibilities for finances, the degree of control in Hungary’s case is not 
comparable, with a veto right on all decisions with financial implications (Pruvot–Estermann, 
2017: 58). 
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As regards tuition fees (or registration fees), trends differ to a large extent throughout Europe. 
As compared to previous years, the general rule remains that universities are not able to 
control tuition fees for Bachelor students (which is the main student population), however, in 
certain countries (England, Ireland and Portugal), universities get more freedom to set fees at 
Master level. There are three main models in Europe: 1) fees may be freely determined by the 
university itself, 2) a public authority may decide on fees, or 3) a public authority and the 
universities may cooperate in setting fees. In sum, the autonomy of universities to determine 
tuition fees has not been reduced in the last decade. Here again, the case of Hungary is 
exceptional, as this is the only European country between 2010 and 2016 where the capacity 
for universities to decide on fee levels was curtailed. There is also a general trend that 
universities are more autonomous in setting fees for international students than for national 
ones. 
The impact of the financial crisis is visible. In the period of few years after the crises begun, 
the decreasing of budget, very often as part of the austerity measures aiming at recovery, was 
a tendency in most European countries. In a few countries, critical underfunding situations 
made the formal autonomy of universities to carry over surpluses or even to borrow money  
Short-term reactions to the crisis have often led to drastic public funding cuts, putting strong 
pressure on universities. 
 
3.3 Staffing Autonomy 
 
Staffing (or human resources) autonomy manages the responsibilities on procedures for staff 
recruitment, remuneration and promotion (Cotelanic et al., 2015: 2). As far as this autonomy 
dimension is concerned, there is a great variety of rules and restrictions applying to 
recruitment and salary setting. There is a general trend of moving away from the civil servant 
model in most European countries; no or a minority of staff have civil servant status in 
Northern Europe, in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, the UK, Austria 
and Luxembourg. This tendency also leads to developments in university autonomy regarding 
recruitment and salary setting. Nevertheless, only in a small majority of European countries 
(Estonia, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland) are universities entirely free to set 
salaries, or negotiate salary bands with other parties. In the remaining countries, salaries or 
salary bands, are regulated externally (i. e. by legislation or other external authorities). There 
are significant differences in recruitment procedures across Europe, ranging from a large 
degree of independence in the recruitment of staff to formalised procedures that necessitate 
the approval of an external authority. In Hungary, the chancellor's authorisation is also needed 
for recruitment, salaries and promotions. 
 
3.4 Academic Autonomy 
 
Academic autonomy refers to the educational offer, educational plans and teaching methods, 
the ability to select admission mechanisms, decisions in various areas, objectives and research 
methods, and the ability to select the institutions for quality assessment (Cotelanic et al., 
2015: 2). There is a continued transition process in a number of European countries, 
contributing to enhanced academic autonomy. This is a move away from programme 
accreditation by national public authorities towards institutional external quality assurance. 
Changes in this field took place in Hungary. Since 2015 universities are permitted to select 
accreditation bodies internationally for Bachelor’s and Master’s programmes. Courses can be 
accredited either by the Hungarian Accreditation Committee or by any organisation member 
of ENQA, the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education. 
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There are three basic models on regulations on the overall number of students. In the first one, 
the national Higher Education system operate on the basis of free admission for everyone 
holding the basic qualifications. However, in some of the European countries the number of 
academic fields, where a numerus clausus applies, is increasing. In the second (opposite) 
model, it is the competence of the university to decide on the number of study places. In 
between these two models, half of the countries apply mixed approaches, where there is a 
certain degree of negotiation or split in the decision-making competences between universities 
and the state. Even in cases where universities can freely decide on student numbers, there 
may be specific limitations, such as nationally set requirements on the staff/student ratio (as in 
Italy), or ceilings for some fields like medicine, dentistry or engineering (as in Sweden). Even 
in free admission systems, such as France, the Netherlands or Switzerland, these (and similar) 
fields may have a numerus clausus. The question will be discussed, on the examples of 
Austria and Belgium, in details below. 
 
3.5 Interim Conclusion  
 
The above analysis led us to the conclusion that there is no uniform trend towards university 
autonomy in Europe. Higher education systems which feature rather high in some dimensions 
are ‘weaker’ in other areas. The priority given to one or the other dimension of autonomy also 
depends on the legal, political or economical context such as the financial situation of the 
country at issue. It is possible, however, to find some 'common denominators'. One (if not the 
most important) is that a challenging economic context (the financial and economic crises for 
all) negatively impacts on university autonomy, at least on its financial dimension. There is 
also a trend of large-scale concentration and ‘rationalisation’ of the academic offer at regional 
or national level, often explained as an effort to improve the overall efficiency of the HE 
system, which also risk to run against the organisational and academic autonomy of 
universities.6 
Anyway, it is apparent from the Scorecard that a reliable comparison of university autonomy 
across borders is highly challenging. The concept of autonomy is understood very differently 
across Europe; associated perceptions and terminology tend to vary quite significantly. This is 
due not only to differing legal frameworks but also to the historical and cultural settings that 
define university autonomy in each country. Therefore, applying the formal indicators for 
defining the level of university autonomy proved to be very difficult in some cases. (Pruvot–
Estermann, 2017: 11) 
The Scorecard further confirmed that, beyond formal indicators, other elements may also 
influence university autonomy. The level of de facto university autonomy is intensively 
affected by indirect factors, as well (sometimes in a more sensitive way than by the 'official' 
indicators). These may be, for instance, changes in the conditions of competitions between 
higher educational institutions due to general policy priorities of the central government or the 
results of other administrative, political, and societal factors. Such indirect indicators often 
seem to be the HE-related 'side-effects' of larger structural reforms in the national legal and 
political system. Conversely, formal indicators do not always (or not as expected) work in the 
reality. (This is the case, for instance where the quality assurance system of a country grants, 
by law, quite enough freedoms for HEIs to introduce new programmes, but other provisions 
prevent these freedom by granting 'exclusive rights' for certain universities as regards the 
teaching and research in specific academic fields. Or they are simply exempted from the 
general accreditation obligations.) Pruvot and Estermann also refer to the difficulties in the 
monitoring as an 'enormous challenge' due to ongoing reforms of legal framework in some 
countries, since "small changes in legislation can alter the picture markedly; conversely, 
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large-scale reforms might not significantly affect the Scorecard indicator." (Pruvot–
Estermann, 2017: 11) 
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Table 2 
Autonomy ranking in Europe 
 
RANK ORGANISATIONAL AUTONOMY FINANCIAL AUTONOMY STAFFING AUTONOMY ACADEMIC AUTONOMY 
 COUNTRY SCORE COUNTRY SCORE COUNTRY SCORE COUNTRY SCORE 
1  United Kingdom 100% Luxembourg 91% Estonia 100% Estonia 98% 
2  Denmark 94% Latvia 90% Sweden 97% Finland 90% 
3  Finland 93% United Kingdom 89% United Kingdom 96% Ireland 89% 
4  French-speaking 
community of Be. 
90% Estonia 77% Switzerland 95% Luxembourg 89% 
5  Estonia 88% The Netherlands 77% Luxembourg 94% United Kingdom 89% 
6  Lithuania 88% Flanders (BE) 76% Finland 92% Hesse (DE) 88% 
7  Portugal 80% Italy 70% Latvia 89% North Rhine- 
Westphalia (DE) 
88% 
8  Austria 78% Portugal 70% Denmark 86% Brandenburg (DE) 87% 
9  Norway 78% Slovakia 70% Poland 84% Norway 83% 
10  Hesse (DE) 77% Denmark 69% Lithuania 83% Iceland 78% 
11  Ireland 73% Finland 67% Flanders (BE) 76% Denmark 75% 
12  Flanders (BE) 70% Switzerland 65% Austria 73% Austria 72% 
13  The Netherlands 69% Ireland 63% The Netherlands 73% Switzerland 72% 
14  North Rhine-
Westpha- lia (DE) 
68% Lithuania 61% Iceland 68% Poland 68% 
15  Poland 67% Croatia 60% Hesse (DE) 63% Sweden 66% 
16  Italy 65% Iceland 60% North Rhine- 
Westphalia (DE) 
63% Hungary 58% 
17  Slovenia 65% Austria 59% Norway 63% Spain 57% 
18  Croatia 62% Slovenia 57% Portugal 62% Italy 56% 
19  Sweden 61% Sweden 56% Slovakia 61% Slovakia 56% 
20  France 59% Spain 55% Brandenburg (DE) 58% Portugal 54% 
21  Brandenburg (DE) 58% Poland 54% Serbia 58% Croatia 50% 
22  Latvia 57% French-speaking 
community of Be. 
52% Hungary 50% The Netherlands 48% 
23  Hungary 56% Serbia 46% Spain 48% Latvia 46% 
24  Spain 55% France 45% French-speaking 
community of Be. 
44% Serbia 46% 
25  Switzerland 55% Brandenburg (DE) 44% Italy 44% Slovenia 44% 
26  Serbia 51% North Rhine- 
Westphalia (DE) 
 Slovenia 44% Lithuania 42% 
27  Iceland 49% Norway 43% France 43% France 37% 
28  Slovakia 42% Hungary 39% Ireland 43% Flanders (BE) 35% 
29  Luxembourg 34% Hesse (DE) 35% Croatia 37% French-speaking 
community of Be. 
32% 
Source: Pruvot–Estermann, 2017 
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4 Higher Education and European Integration 
 
By the end of the first half of the 20th century, European universities traditionally served the 
public (national) interest by teaching and conducting research rather than commercially 
exploitable aims. They were financed mainly by the state. (Gideon, 2017: 7). Most European 
higher education institutions still remained 'national' today, despite the principle that academic 
research and education is 'universal', not restricted by national frontiers (Tóth, 2017: 21). The 
Magna Charta confirms that "A university is the trustee of the European humanist tradition; 
its constant care is to attain universal knowledge; to fulfil its vocation it transcends 
geographical and political frontiers, and affirms the vital need for different cultures to know 
and influence each other." It is also emphasised that "...far-reaching co-operation between all 
European nations and believing that people and States should become more than ever aware 
of the part that universities will be called upon to play in a changing and increasingly 
international society." 
The above mission obviously raises the question of what role supranational integrations have 
in spreading this 'transnational knowledge'. After early (more or less successful) attempts 
(Barblan, 2001: 31-58), the first significant step towards an international cooperation was the 
Bologna Declaration in 1999 which officially launched the Bologna process. Its overall aim 
was to create a system of academic degrees that are easily recognisable and comparable; to 
promote the mobility of students, teachers and researchers; and to establish a European 
Higher Education Area by 2010 including the achievement of a common three-cycle study 
structure (undergraduate, master and doctoral level), the usage of ECTS and the introduction 
of an international quality assurance system. This policy process is a voluntary undertaking by 
each signing country to reform its own education system which does not give rise to legally 
binding obligations imposed on national governments or universities. 
The Bologna Declaration represents a different view to university autonomy as compared to 
the classical meaning under Magna Charta: instead of declaring it as a guiding principle 
(itself), the former document's approach is rather instrumental providing that "Universities' 
independence and autonomy ensure that higher education and research systems continuously 
adapt to changing needs, society's demands and advances in scientific knowledge." [emphasis 
added] 
Although the Bologna Process (with 48 participating countries today) was initiated by 
individual countries, its driving force across the continent is now the European Union 
(Moutsios, 2012: 3). This is the case despite the fact that the 'project' is not the part of the EU 
education policy in a formal way and remained out of the institutional and decision-making 
framework of the European Union. Currently, all EU Member States and the European 
Commission are involved in the Process. 
In the early stage of the EU integration, the EU (EC) did not have any expressly declared 
competence in the field of education. Initially, the European Economic Community (EEC) has 
been founded as a (pure) regional economic integration, and economic law, at least on the 
surface, does not have anything to do with higher education which is, by its traditional nature, 
a non-economic activity.  
Nevertheless, a functional spillover from the free movement provisions of EU internal market 
(common market) law occurred early on (Gideon, 2017: 25, 38).7 This is because the 
operation of the internal market may definitely be influenced by Member States' HEI 
regulations in case they fall within the application of the fundamental economic freedom(s). 
The role of the EU judicial body (Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU or ECJ) is 
especially important in supporting this functional spillover. The case-law made clear that 
internal market provisions and general principles of EU law should not be altered by the 
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exercise of national regulatory power or administrative practice in the field of education. With 
the extensive interpretation of 'vocational training' as an important instrument to promote free 
movement of persons throughout the EU,8 the ECJ already built a bridge between universities 
and the 'economic pillars' of the European integration. In its Gravier judgment, the Court 
made clear that "any form of education which prepares for a qualification for a particular 
profession, trade or employment or which provides the necessary training and skills for such a 
profession, trade or employment is vocational training, whatever the age and the level of 
training of the pupils or students, and even if the training programme includes an element of 
general education." (Gravier, para. 30; see also the judgments of the ECJ in cases 24/86 
Blaizot v Université de Liège others ECLI:EU:C:1988:43 and 242/87 Commission v Council 
[ERASMUS](ECLI:EU:C:1989:217). Equal treatment rule thud also apply here. Therefore, 
the imposition of a charge or a registration fee as a condition of access to vocational training 
on students who are nationals of other Member States, where the same fee is not imposed on 
nationals of the host Member State, constitutes discrimination on grounds of nationality 
contrary to Article 18 TFEU (Gravier, para. 26). 
 
The Court also confirmed the requirement of equal treatment arising from the free movement 
of persons (as a part of the freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment and 
worker's rights) with regard to the professional recognition of diplomas and other 
qualifications. Therefore, it was necessary to adopt harmonisation measures at EU level in this 
field in order to guarantee access to regulated professions (Gideon, 2017: 25, 38). 
Higher education activities are considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of Article 56 
TFEU9 where they are provided for remuneration (Article 57 TFEU). However it is often 
difficult to decide if this is really the case or not. Actually, it depends on the question of 
whether the education activity in case can be qualified as an ‘economic activity’.10 The 
concept of non-economic services is, however, not clearly defined in EU law,11 and, due to 
political choice or economic developments, the classification of a given activity can change 
over time.12 Thus, a large 'grey area' exists between these two categories (SGEI-NESGI), in 
particular in the field of health, education, social services and housing (Bauby and Similie, 
2016). This is also true for higher education since the scope of 'university mission' has became 
more and more complex for today (including the growing number of 'borderline cases' 
between commercially available education and those provided as public service). 
Early on, the Court has not considered education activities which are part of the national 
education system to be a service provided for remuneration under Articles 56 and 57 TFEU.13 
However, if education is provided by institutions which are  financed essentially out of private 
funds, in particular by students or their parents, and which seek to make an economic profit", 
it would fall under the scope of  the above  provisions. (C-109/92 Wirth, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:916, para. 17; Gideon, 2017: 38–39). In addition, as a result of on-going 
commercialisation of higher education activities at the national level, the Court declared 
educational activities provided by universities (even by public universities) to be services in 
the meaning of Article 56 in a number of cases (Gideon, 2017: 39). 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (entered into force in 1993) increased the EU role in higher 
education matters by enacting general education, including higher education, as a new policy 
area into the Treaty structure (now Articles 165 and 166 TFEU). However, this EU 
competence is still limited and do not enable its institutions to harmonise national education 
systems.14 It only extend to carry out measures to support, coordinate or supplement Member 
States' actions. Accordingly, current Article 165(1) TFEU on education, vocational training, 
youth and sport provides that "The Union shall contribute to the development of quality 
education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the 
11 
 
Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their 
cultural and linguistic diversity". (See also Article 6 TFEU in this sense). 
 
Despite the limited EU competences, the above mentioned spillover effect of fundamental 
freedoms and general EU law principles are still operating. This is what gives an impetus for 
the CJEU to apply Articles 165 and 166 TFEU (combined with the 'spillovering' Treaty 
provisions) in defining the scope of 'cross-border rights' to access to higher education. The 
role of Article 18(1) TFEU prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality is especially 
important in this respect. EU-law based rights in the field of education are also supported by 
laying down the foundations of EU citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht. Article 21(1) 
TFEU generally recognises the free movement rights of EU citizens (for non-economic 
residents, as well) including students who have the ambition to study in another country. 
The question of university autonomy in the EU legal and regulatory framework received a 
large international focus in the light of a recent case concerning the position of the privately-
founded Central European University (CEU) in Hungary. The CEU case will be analysed in 
details below. Before doing that, through presenting examples in CJEU case-law, we examine 
the enforcement mechanisms available for higher education issues at EU level. 
The CJEU has several times the occasion to rule on the EU law compatibility of national 
higher education laws under the above provisions. Three judgments (in details, see: Garben, 
2010; Dagilyte, 2011) will be discussed here; though not expressly mentioning 'university 
autonomy' in the reasoning, all of them deliver an important message on EU law 
understanding of this concept. 
 
In case C-147/03 Commission v Belgium, the Commission initiated an infringement 
procedure against the Kingdom of Belgium considering that national legislation15, applied to 
courses in medical studies, dental and veterinary science, and agricultural engineering in 
Belgium, infringed the above mentioned Treaty articles. The contested provisions prescribed 
that nationals of other Member States possessing qualifications awarded on successful 
completion of secondary studies at a home Member State, must take and pass an aptitude test. 
The ECJ, in line with the Commission's argumentation held that, because of this additional 
requirement to access to higher education, Belgian nationals and nationals of other Member 
States were treated differently, which resulted in discrimination on the grounds on nationality. 
The ECJ therefore concluded that Belgium ‘failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 18 
TFEU, read in conjunction with Articles 165 and 166 TFEU.  
In case C-65/03, Commission v Austria  the Law on University Studies (the Universitäts-
Studiengesetz (the ) was questioned, where special requirements for foreign EU students were 
established. The contested national law required that ‘[i]n addition to possession of a general 
university entrance qualification, students must demonstrate that they meet the specific 
entrance requirements for the relevant course of study, including entitlement to immediate 
admission, applicable in the State which issued the general qualification’. The Court held that 
Austrian law constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of nationality, since such rules 
resulted in higher proportion of Austrian students than EU students in Austrian universities. 
The fact that these provisions applied to all students did not matter, as the effect of it was 
discriminatory. The Court concluded that this indirect discrimination could not be justified 
either on safeguarding the homogeneity of the Austrian higher or university education system, 
or preventing abuse of EU law, or because of Austria’s obligations under international law. 
The above judgments clearly show that, despite the lack of 'de facto' legislative competence in 
higher education matters, on the basis of its fundamental legal values incorporated into Treaty 
texts, the EU definitely has instruments to give rise to those HE issues which are in line with 
the aim of the European integration. Nevertheless, strong national interests in higher 
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education affairs may prevent the effective enforceability of such far-reaching decisions, as it 
was demonstrated by the afterlife of these infringement procedures. Both Austria and Belgium 
decided not to comply with the Court’s ruling: they passed new legislation in response to the 
judgments. In June 2006 the French Community adopted a new decree capping the number of 
foreign students (mainly French) at 30% in in nine medical or paramedical courses dominated 
by non-nationals.16 On the day the judgment in Commission v Austria was delivered, Austria 
ended unlimited access to free medical education, too: 75% of the places in Austrian medical 
schools would be reserved for students who finished their secondary education in Austria; 
20% of the places were left for EU students; and 5% for third-country-nationals (TCNs). 
The Commission opined that these measures were discriminatory and initiated new 
infringement procedures against Austria and Belgium. Ten months later, however, it suddenly 
decided to suspend both proceedings (Garben, 2010: 1497). The Commission argued, on the 
record, that there was prima facie evidence that without the restrictive measure, a potential 
shortage of health professional could led to problems in the territorial coverage and quality of 
the Austrian and Belgian health systems. Off the record, a bargain17 behind the Lisbon Treaty 
negotiations was supposed to be the reason why the Commission altered its stance (Garben, 
2010: 1497–1498; Goldirova, 2007). 
In the third case Bressol & Chaverot, French students, as well as teaching and administrative 
staff of higher education institutions in the French Community (more than 60 individuals 
altogether),  challenged the above mentioned Belgian decree of 2006 before the Belgian 
Constitutional Court seeking annulment of that measure. The applicants argued that the quota 
provided by the Belgian provisions infringed the principle of non-discrimination by treating 
resident and non-resident students differently, for no valid reason.  
For 'saving' the contested decree, the Belgian Government argued that the legislation at issue 
is necessary for ensuring the quality and continuing provision of medical and paramedical 
care within the French Community.18 The large numbers of non-resident students are likely to 
bring about a shortage of qualified medical personnel throughout the territory which would 
undermine the system of public health within the French Community. 
The CJEU confirmed, first, that the national legislation at issue affects, by its very nature, 
nationals of Member States other than Belgium more than Belgian nationals and such an 
indirect discrimination is, as a general rule, precluded by Articles 18 and 21 TFEU. However, 
in line with the argumentation of the Belgian government,  the Court found that the protection 
of health and for that purpose the maintaining a balanced high-quality medical service open to 
all, could constitute a legitimate objective capable of justifying the contested measure 
(Garben, 2010: 1502). All in all, the Court came to the final conclusion that the Belgian 
legislation at issue did not infringe EU Treaty provisions on EU citizens' rights and non-
discrimination. 
 National legislations like those examined in the above cases can obviously influence the 
freedom of higher education institutions to decide on their student intake. As decision-making 
on student number is an integral part of the 'academic autonomy', the conclusion can be drawn 
that fundamental EU law principles and ECJ case-law on their interpretation in higher 
education context might definitely have an influence on the state of play of university 
autonomy in Europe – even though the collective message of the above three judgments is not 
optimistic from the perspective of academic freedom. Because of strong national interests in 
this matter, higher education basically remains in Member States' hands. Articles 165 and 166 
TFEU, and EU law obligations in other fields do not seem to prevent Member States from 
taking measures against university autonomy and the freedom of access to higher education. 
Although, as Corbett and Gordon argue, "Many of the major political events in the EU’s 
history have had a spillover effect, enhancing EU involvement in higher education in the 
process, the bottom line remains: an education system as a whole is an expression of national 
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sovereignty as emphasised in Article 165."19 (Corbett and Gordon, 2017). 
 
 
5 Is University Autonomy Enforceable? 
 
The need for academic freedom, to which university autonomy is a precondition, is also 
expressed (explicitly or implicitly) in the relevant documents of the European Union. Article 
13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that "The arts and scientific research shall 
be free of constraint" and "Academic freedom shall be respected."The content of that 
provision routed in the freedom of expression as a specific form of that freedom in higher 
education context (Király, 2017: 5) which is also the part of the EU general legal principles. 
Despite the express declaration, it remains questionable whether the European Union has the 
appropriate means to enforce compliance with that general principle. First, it is clear from the 
above picture that economic (or equal treatment-based) pillars of the EU 'toolkit' are stronger 
than the 'real' higher education policy instruments which do not impose legally binding 
obligations on Member States. Conversely, the binding force of fundamental freedoms and 
non-discrimination principle, which definitely have an influence on certain aspects of national 
higher education governance, are beyond doubt. However, their impact on university 
autonomy was only indirect by now as was illustrated by the above presented cases (Gravier 
and the three infringement procedures). Moreover, the potential difficulties in the judicial 
enforcement mechanism (see below) also has to be taken into consideration when 
appreciating the effectiveness of EU law instruments. Finally, the EU approach to university 
autonomy is rather functional (similarly to that of the Bologna Declaration) as it is clearly 
expressed by the Commission's communication on the role of the universities in the Europe of 
knowledge: "After remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a very long period, both in 
relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and a status protected 
by respect for their autonomy, European universities have gone through the second half of the 
20th century without really calling into question the role or the nature of what they should be 
contributing to society." (European Commission, 2003) 
Nevertheless, the spring of 2017 gave a new opportunity for testing whether EU response may 
be effective enough to ensure the protection of EU basic values in the field of higher 
education. On 10th April the Hungarian parliament adopted an amendment to the National 
Higher Education Law which became known as ‘Lex CEU’ after the university that seems to 
be most directly targeted. CEU (Central European University) has a dual legal entity – an 
American entity registered in New York and a Hungarian entity, which has allowed it to 
award both Hungarian and US-accredited degrees. This private university is one of the most 
prominent higher education institutions in Hungary which has been operating in Budapest 
since 1991. 
The new law is particularly troubling from two aspects. First, it makes the operation of any 
international university in the country subject to an intergovernmental agreement between 
Hungary and the other country of accreditation (in which both governments give their consent 
to things such as the curriculum the university teaches or admissions policies). Another 
problematic point in the ‘Lex CEU’ is that it requires institutions operating in Hungary to 
have a campus in their home country.  
 
The announcement of the ‘Lex CEU’ (combined with the political message of the case and the 
extremely quick legislation process avoiding consultation with the actors concerned) gave rise 
to a loud protest worldwide and also triggered the available mechanisms to enforce adherence 
to values and legal principles which seemed to be infringed by the Hungarian law. The 
European Commission decided to use "all available means under the Treaties to uphold the 
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EU's shared values." 
 
On the basis of an in-depth legal assessment of the Hungarian Higher Education Law, the 
European Commission sent on 27 April a letter of formal notice to the Hungarian Government 
under Article 258 TFEU (infringement procedure, see above).20 According to this letter, the 
amendment of Hungarian Higher Education Law is not compatible with the freedom to 
provide services and the freedom of establishment and also infringes the right of academic 
freedom, the right to education and the freedom to conduct a business as provided by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as well as with the Union's legal obligations under 
international trade law. In its reasoned opinion (this is the second step of the infringement 
procedure), the Commission repeated these legal concerns. In the six decades of European 
integration, this is the first time when the law of a Member State is challenged directly due to 
the infringement of academic freedom. 
Despite that, it is still questionable whether an infringement procedure may be effective 
enough to enforce university autonomy. We don't think that such a 'rank' in the reasoned 
opinion itself would significantly change the Court's attitude to EU competences and national 
autonomy in the field of higher education. It nevertheless seems to be promising that the 
Commission, together with academic freedom, invoked other reasons for incompatibility such 
as fundamental internal market freedoms and that may be fruitful for private universities like 
CEU.21 There are, however, more general concerns regarding infringement procedures. First, 
such procedures very often terminate even before reaching the judicial level (the CJEU). Or, 
if they do not, the time by which any decision is made proved often to be too late for those 
whose interest is concerned. Secondly, infringement actions are usually too narrow to address 
the structural problem which persistently non-compliant Member States pose. (Halmai, 2017) 
Triggering 'Article 7 procedure' also arose as a possible solution. Article 7 TEU22 provides a 
non-judicial mechanism to enforce EU values. In May 2017, the European Parliament adopted 
a resolution asking EU Member States to launch Article 7 against Hungary, since the adoption 
of the contested higher education law amendment (together with other issues such as the 
regulations against asylum-seekers and NGOs) could led to “a serious deterioration of the rule 
of law.” As a result of applying Article 7, certain rights of a Member State can be suspended, 
including voting rights in the Council (which is, together with the European Parliament, the 
main decision-making institution in the EU). Though EU Member State has never been so 
close to be sanctioned by 'the EU's nuclear bomb', in reality, there is very little chance of 
Article 7 actually coming into effect. Suspending rights is only the final step of the procedure 
and requires a unanimous decision of the Council which does not seem to be realistic in light 
of political cooperations between Member States (see Hungary’s veto in the rule of law 
procedure against Poland and the same can be expected vice versa). 
 
Conclusions 
 
University autonomy is widely considered as an important prerequisite for modern 
universities to be able to deliver efficiently their public service missions. This is very complex 
nowadays, since beyond the classical education and research tasks it also involves new 
functions that universities and research institutions are expected to fulfil. 
Our analysis shows that there is no uniform trend towards university autonomy in Europe. 
Due to differing legal frameworks and historical, cultural settings, the concept itself is 
understood very differently across Europe what did not make easier to carry out a reliable 
comparison between the European countries. It was also proved that, beyond formal 
autonomy indicators, other 'secondary' or indirect factors also have a decisive role in 
determination the level of de facto university autonomy in a country. Despite all that, it is 
15 
 
possible to find some 'common denominators'. It can generally be established that the 
challenging economic context (the impact of the financial and economic crises for all) 
negatively affects university autonomy, at least its financial dimension. There is also a trend 
of large-scale concentration and ‘rationalisation’ of the academic offer at regional or national 
level, often explained as an effort to improve the overall efficiency of the HE system, which 
also risk to run against the organisational and academic autonomy of universities. 
As regards general trends covering all dimensions of university autonomy, two main groups 
of European states can be distinguished: a 'regulatory' model and an 'interventional' 
('authoritarian') model. In the former group, more 'indirect' steering mechanisms or less 
restrictive regulatory instruments prevail over direct state intervention (typically in Western 
European countries). In the second case, various means of direct state influence and high level 
of government control plays a central role (see for instance the case of Hungary). 
In this paper, we also examined the role EU governance instruments in safeguarding academic 
freedom and university autonomy. Because of strong national interests in this matter, higher 
education basically remains in Member States' hands. Soft law measures of EU education 
policy are not able to prevent the countries from taking measures against academic freedom 
and university autonomy. Though EU law instruments in other fields such as fundamental 
freedoms and non-discrimination principle, due to their spillover effect, definitely have an 
influence on certain aspects of national higher education governance, their impact on 
university autonomy was only indirect by now. Even if this is not the case (as above in the 
'lex CEU' infringement procedure), it still remains a question whether the available 
enforcement mechanisms are effective enough to save these common European values. 
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Notes 
 
1 The terms 'university' and 'HEI' are used interchangeably in this paper as in other literatures on the subject (see 
Gideon, 2017; Garben, 2010). 
2 The first study 'University Autonomy I' released in 2009 and compared 34 European countries in the four key 
areas of autonomy. 
3 All countries allow universities to create non-profit entities, about two-thirds extend this prerogative (without 
constraints) to for-profit legal entities. 
4 Block grants are understood as financial grants that cover several categories of expenditure, such as teaching, 
operational costs and/or research activities. 
5 In a line-item budget, the ministry or parliament pre-allocate university funding to cost items and activities. 
6 In our context, 'concentration' must be distinguished from 'centralization'. This is the case for instance in 
Hungary where HE courses in public administration has gradually been monopolised, so only one university 
(National University of Public Service) is authorized by law to introduce degree programs in this field. For a 
proper understanding of the process, it must be seen together with the Hungarian government's recent measures 
aiming at a systematic change of public administration and public service, as well as with the more general trend 
from 2010 towards greater public control over public services (for an analysis of the latter, see Horváth, 2016: 
190–196). 
7 A similar functional spillover can be seen in the field of health services. For a more detailed analysis of the 
health sector in this sense, see Hoffman, 2015: 137–147; Nistor, 2011: 285–325. 
8 "Access to vocational training is in particular likely to promote free movement of persons throughout the 
Community, by enabling them to obtain a qualification in the Member State where they intend to work and by 
enabling them to complete their training and develop their particular talents in the Member State whose 
vocational training programmes include the special subject desired." (C-293/83 Gravier ECLI:EU:C:1985:69, 
para. 24) 
9 Under Article 56 TFEU, "... restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for 
whom the services are intended." 
10 As the ECJ explains, 'services' include in particular activities of an industrial or commercial character" and 
"The essential characteristic of remuneration thus lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service 
in question, and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service." (Judgment in 
case 263/86 Humbel (ECLI:EU:C:1988:451) paras 16 and 17). 
11 As regards application of internal market rules, any service provided under remuneration is to be considered as 
an economic activity, even if the service is not paid by those who directly benefit from and independently of the 
legal statute of the entity providing the service or the nature of the service (see ECJ judgments in cases C-172/98 
and C-157/99; Bauby and Similie, 2016) 
12 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, 2012/C 8/02 para. 12 
13 First, because "the State, in establishing and maintaining such a system, is not seeking to engage in gainful 
activity but is fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields." 
Secondly, the system in question is, as a general rule, funded from the public purse and not by students. 
(Humbel, para. 18) 
14 See Article 166(4) TFEU " In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives [of EU education policy] 
the European Parliament and the Council [...] shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States..." and "... the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall 
adopt recommendations." 
15 1971 decree governing the academic recognition of qualifications and diplomas awarded on completion of 
secondary studies and access to higher education and university education in the French Community 
16 Décret régulant le nombre d’étudiants dans certains cursus de premier cycle de l’enseignement supérieur 
(Decree 
regulating the number of students in certain programmes in the first two years of undergraduate studies in higher 
education, 16 June 2006. 
17 The suspension of the infringment procedure alleged to be the reason why Austria gave up (a few days before 
the Lisbon summit) its demand for a special treaty protocol, which would have allowed it to set a cap on the 
number of foreign university students to be taken in (Garben, 2010: 1497–1498; Goldirova, 2007). 
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18 First, according to the Belgian Government, the restriction is needed to keep the quality of teaching in the 
medical and paramedical courses where a certain number of students is exceeded, as the capacity of the higher 
education establishments, the available staff and the possibilities of practical training are not unlimited. Second, 
the non-resident students, after their studies, very often return to their country of origin to exercise their 
profession there and the number of resident graduates remains too low in some specialties. 
19 In 1971, for instance, a process began whereby education ministers sought Commission support under the 
Council of Ministers’ protection. In 1985-86, the Single Market impetus shaped the political climate and a pilot 
scheme for university collaboration and mobility was transformed into the Erasmus programme. The Lisbon 
Agenda of 2000, with its introduction of the open method of coordination, contributed to a further marked 
increase in educational policy coordination (Corbett and Gordon, 2017). 
20 The letter of formal notice is the first step in the administrative phase of the so called infringement procedure 
under Article 258 TFEU. This provision authorises the European Commission to launch such a procedure when 
it considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the EU Treaties. 
21 The Court of Justice of the EU has consistently held that courses offered by educational establishments 
essentially financed by private funds constitute economic activities in the meaning of the Treaty. Education 
activities and courses financed essentially out of private funds are also covered by Directive 2006/123/EC, 
regardless of whether the establishments offering courses are profit-making or not and irrespective of whether 
the financing is provided principally by the pupils or their parents. 
22 Under Article 7(1), the Council may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of EU values by a 
Member State and is intended to prevent an actual breach by addressing specific recommendations to the 
Member State in question. This can be triggered by one third of Member States, by Parliament or by the 
Commission. The Council has to adopt a decision by a four-fifths majority after having received Parliament's 
consent which also requires a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and an absolute majority of MEPs. 
The next phase is Article 7(2), by which an actual breach of EU values can be determined by the Council on a 
proposal by a third of Member States or the Commission. The Council needs to decide by unanimity and the 
Parliament needs to give its consent. Article 7(3) launches sanctions, such as the suspension of voting rights in 
the Council. 
 
